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Although employment at individual ﬁrms tends to be highly non-stationary, the employment size
distribution of all ﬁrms in the United States appears to be stationary. It closely resembles a Pareto
distribution. There is a lot of entry and exit, mostly of small ﬁrms. This paper surveys general
equilibrium models that can be used to interpret these facts and explores the role of innovation by
new and incumbent ﬁrms in determining aggregate growth. The existence of a balanced growth
path with a stationary employment size distribution depends crucially on assumptions made about
the cost of entry. Some type of labor must be an essential input in setting up new ﬁrms.
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It has long been known that the employment size distribution of ﬁr m si sh i g h l ys k e w e d .
In modern US data, the number of ﬁrms with more than n employees behaves roughly
like 1/nζ, for some tail index ζ slightly greater than 1. This implies that a large share
of aggregate employment is accounted for by a relatively small number of large ﬁrms.
There are about 6 million employer ﬁrms in the US. Around half of the labor force of
these ﬁrms is employed by the roughly 18,000 ﬁrms with more than 500 employees, and a
good quarter is accounted for by the 1,000 or so ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees.
This pattern of extreme skewness appears to be quite stable over time, although the
existence of large private corporations is of course a relatively modern phenomenon.
Firms play an important role in theories of aggregate growth and ﬂuctuations. Yet,
few studies in which ﬁrm boundaries matter are consistent with the highly skewed size
distribution observed in the data. The situation is diﬀerent in the modern trade liter-
ature. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple [2004], Melitz [2003], Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum [2003], Eaton, Kortum and Kramartz [2008] are leading examples of quantita-
tive theories of trade that explicitly take into account the ﬁrm size distribution. In most
of the work on trade, the Fréchet or Pareto-like size distribution is a direct reﬂection
of an underlying productivity distribution. But the origin of this productivity distri-
bution is typically left unexplained, and one could argue that this amounts to setting
aside the most important puzzle in the data. Even the extreme-value interpretation of
Kortum [1997] and Eaton and Kortum [1999] depends on an underlying distribution of
productivities that is itself skewed. In large samples, the maximum of a random sample
from a distribution with compact support does not converge to a thick-tailed Fréchet
distribution but piles up near the upper bound of that support.1
This paper surveys general equilibrium models that can be used to interpret the 1/nζ
phenomenon. These models build on a rich history of research on ﬁrm growth and size
d i s t r i b u t i o n s . N oa t t e m p ti sm a d eh e r et oc over this history (see Sutton [1997], Neal
and Rosen [2000], and Gabaix [1999, 2009].) Although several examples are taken from
the trade literature, trade is not the focus here. This survey also cannot do justice to
the vast and related literature on innovation and growth. Excellent survey and textbook
presentations can be found in Aghion and Durlauf [2005] and Acemoglu [2008]. The
object of interest here is the ﬁrm–not establishments, such as manufacturing plants,
1See Alvarez, Buera and Lucas [2008] for more on the relation between the distribution from which
productivities are drawn and the distribution of frontier productivities.
1administrative oﬃces, or retail stores.2 In data constructed by the U.S. Census, there is a
fairly clear empirical deﬁnition of an employer ﬁrm. Models diﬀer in their interpretation
of this empirical construct.
The discussion is organized around two polar interpretations of the ﬁrm size distri-
bution. One is that the 1/nζ tail is the result of replication of organization capital. A
ﬁrm is deﬁned by its ﬁrm-speciﬁc organization capital, and it takes pieces of this capital
to create more pieces. This can easily give rise to Gibrat’s law–the proposition that
ﬁrm growth rates are independent of size. If there is also persistent entry of small new
ﬁrms, then the Pareto-like tail follows. In the simplest version of this interpretation, all
organization capital is the same and there are no productivity diﬀerences. All measured
productivity diﬀerences must be attributed to unobserved diﬀerences in the quantity of
organization capital across ﬁrms.3 More plausibly, there are diﬀerences in the quality
of organization capital across ﬁrms. Firms with high-quality organization capital have
strong incentives to create more of it. These ﬁrms will grow fast and large ﬁrms will be
those that have had frontier-quality organization capital for a suﬃciently long time.
The second polar interpretation is that ﬁrm size directly reﬂects productivity dif-
ferences, moderated only by decreasing returns to scale or downward sloping demand
curves. The scale of the ﬁrm can be adjusted instantaneously and ﬁrm growth is the
result of productivity growth. If productivity growth is independent of productivity lev-
els, Gibrat’s law can again arise and entry of suﬃciently productive new ﬁrms will result
in a stationary distribution with a Pareto-like tail. Randomness in ﬁrm-level produc-
tivity growth can be interpreted as learning by doing or experimentation. Firms with
suﬃciently many lucky draws survive and others are forced to exit. If entrants can do
better than these exiting ﬁrms, the economy-wide productivity distribution will trend
upwards over time.
In both types of economies, not enough entry would result in non-stationary size
distributions, typically with a thin right tail. When the productivity of incumbent
ﬁrms improves over time, enough entry to induce stationarity can only occur if potential
entrants can take advantage of the improvements made by incumbents.4 This can happen
2See Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [2007] for empirical evidence and a general equilibrium model of
establishment size dynamics. In the US, the right tail of the size distribution of establishments is
noticeably thinner than that of ﬁrms.
3McGrattan and Prescott [2009] emphasize the importance of unmeasured investment.
4An important alternative possibility, not considered here, is that relative prices change to allow
new industries to arise. Entrants into these new industries need not learn anything from incumbents in
old industries.
2through trade of something that embodies those improvements, or as a result of imitation
externalities. The welfare implications are diﬀerent. Both mechanisms for the transfer
of knowledge are likely to play a role empirically, and it is a continuing challenge to
quantify their relative importance. The fact that the stationary distribution has a tail
index ζ only slightly above 1 arises because, while there is suﬃcient entry for stationarity,
incumbent ﬁrms account for much of aggregate employment growth.
The rest of this survey is divided into three parts. The motivating evidence is brieﬂy
discussed in Section 2. The organization capital and productivity interpretations are
presented in Sections 3 and 4, with hybrid models appearing in both sections. Through-
out, the focus is on examples that are suﬃciently tractable to allow one to think through
aggregate implications.5
2. Srph Mruh Fdfwv
Figure 1 shows that the aggregate civilian labor force and various ﬁrm counts exhibit
a common trend over the past 80 or so years. Completely consistent ﬁrm counts over
this period are not available. Lucas [1978] used the series V13 “Firms in Operation”
published in the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The County Business Patterns
(CBP) publication of the U.S. Census provides a long series of what were referred to
as reporting units before 1974 and subsequently became establishments. The Small
Business Administration (SBA) reports both a count of ﬁrms and of establishments,
including establishments that have zero employment during the March reporting period.
Establishments that do have employment in that period correspond to the establishments
reported in the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) of the Census, available since 1977.
The old V13 ﬁrm count was discontinued after 1963 after errors were discovered. Rather
mysteriously, the V13 number of ﬁrms exceeds the County Business Patterns number of
reporting units by a wide margin. As one would expect, the SBA establishment count
exceeds its ﬁrm count.
The ﬁrm size distributions reported by the SBA for 1992, 2000 and 2006 are shown
in Figure 2. The ﬁrst and second panel show the left and right cumulative distribution
functions, respectively. The Pareto right tail and the fact that the tail index is close to
1 are evident. A simple regression based on ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 0 0e m p l o y e e sg i v e sa
5See Weintraub, Benkard and van Roy [2008] for an attempt to narrow the gap between the Hopen-
hayn [1992] style models considered here and models that allow for dynamic strategic interaction such
as Ericson and Pakes [1995].
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Fljxuh 2 The Firm Size Distribution
tail index of ζ ≈ 1.06. Although the SBA data do not go back in time very far, Figure
2 clearly suggests a size distribution that is stationary. This stability can be illustrated
further using BDS data that go back to 1977. The BDS does not show ﬁrm counts but
it does report aggregate employment accounted for by various ﬁrm size categories. The
4share of aggregate employment in the right tail of the ﬁrm size distribution as reported
by the BDS is shown in Figure 3.
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Fljxuh 3 The Right Cumulative Distribution of Employment Across Firms
Although the repeated cross-sections are stable, the picture for individual ﬁrms could
n o tb em o r ed i ﬀerent. Since Gibrat [1931], the empirical benchmark is that ﬁrms grow
according to Gibrat’s law: growth rates are independent of size. Thus the size of an indi-
vidual ﬁrm is non-stationary. Sutton [1997] surveys the literature. Hall [1987] suggests
that Gibrat’s law cannot be rejected for large ﬁrms and only weakly for small ﬁrms.
Evans [1987] ﬁnds that ﬁrm growth rates decrease with size, even after controlling for
selection issues related to exit. He also ﬁnds an important role for age, as do Dunne,
Roberts and Samuelson [1989]. Small and young ﬁrms are very volatile and highly likely
to exit. SBA data for 1988-2006 show an average exit rate of about 10.4% per annum for
ﬁrms with fewer than 20 employees, versus 2.5% for ﬁrms with 500 or more employees.
Compared with small ﬁrms, few large and established ﬁrms disappear in a given year.
A revealing piece of evidence on what large ﬁrms are like is shown in Figure 4. It
shows the average number of establishments of all ﬁrms in the ﬁrm employment size
categories reported by the SBA. Not shown is the average number of establishments per
ﬁrm, equal to 676, in the unbounded size category of 10,000 or more employees. For
ﬁrms with more than about 100 employees, the relationship is essentially log-linear, with
5an elasticity only slightly below 1. The average large ﬁrm has many establishments, and









































Fljxuh 4 The Average Number of Establishments per Firm
3. Oujdql}dwlrq Cdslwdo
A natural way to obtain Gibrat’s law and Pareto-like size distributions is to take ﬁrm
size to reﬂect accumulated organization capital, as in Prescott and Visscher [1980]. In
the examples given here, entrepreneurs create start-up capital, and this capital can be
used to produce consumption and more of the same capital. A ﬁrm is identiﬁed with
all the capital produced, directly or indirectly, from the same initial start-up stock of
capital. Transferring capital from one ﬁrm to another is taken to be suﬃciently costly
for it not to occur.
3.1 A Deterministic Example
Consider an economy with a population of inﬁnitely lived inﬁnitesimal agents Ht =
Heηt that grows at a positive rate. Agents have a subjective discount rate ρ > η and
logarithmic utility over per-capita consumption ﬂows. Everyone can exert one unit of
eﬀort per unit of time. This eﬀort can be used to supply labor or to create start-up
capital, as an entrepreneur. Individuals are endowed with a skill vector that determines
the amount of labor they can supply, and the rate at which they can create start-
up capital. The distribution of these skills is time invariant, and agents choose to be
workers or entrepreneurs based on comparative advantage, as in Roy [1951]. Speciﬁcally,
suppose the price of a unit of start-up capital is qt and the wage is wt,b o t hi nu n i t s
6of consumption. An agent who can supply x units of labor or create a unit of start-up
capital at a Poisson rate y will choose to be a worker if wtx>q ty and an entrepreneur if
the reverse inequality holds. Using the skill distribution to sum over all agents will give
r i s et oap e r - c a p i t al a b o rs u p p l yL(qt/wt) and a per-capita supply of start-up capital
E(qt/wt). Clearly, these functions are decreasing and increasing in qt/wt, respectively.
A newly created ﬁrm starts out with one unit of start-up capital. Once the ﬁrm
is created, there is joint production: its capital can simultaneously be used to produce
consumption goods and more capital. Consumption can be produced according to a
production function F(nt,n tlt),w h e r ent ∈ [1,∞) is the capital stock of the ﬁrm, and
nt × lt is production labor. The ﬁrm’s capital stock grows according to
Dnt = G(nt,n tmt) (1)
where ntmt is capital-producing labor. Both F and G are increasing, concave, and
exhibit constant returns to scale. The assumption of constant returns ensures that the
value of the ﬁrm can be written as the price of a unit of capital times the capital stock of
the ﬁrm. Given an interest rate rt, the price of one unit of capital satisﬁes the Bellman
equation
rtqt =m a x
l,m≥0
{F(1,l)+qtG(1,m) − wt(l + m)+D qt} (2)
and a transversality condition.
This structure is clearly reminiscent of Lucas [1967] and Hayashi [1982]. But observe
that ﬁnal output in this economy is used only for consumption. Capital is produced
either using old capital and labor, or from scratch by entrepreneurs. The economy
has a balanced growth path in which per-capita consumption is constant and capital is
a c c u m u l a t e dt ok e e pu pw i t hp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t h .A l o n gt h eb a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t h ,t h e
interest rate is rt = ρ and [qt,w t]=[ q,w]. Given interest rates and wages, the price of
a unit of capital is determined by
w =D 2F(1,l)=qD2G(1,m), q =
F(1,l) − w(l + m)
ρ − G(1,m)
. (3)
Firm employment equals l + m times the capital stock of the ﬁrm. Let Neηt denote
the aggregate capital stock along the balanced growth path. The labor market clearing
condition is then
(l + m)N = L(q/w)H. (4)
Existing capital produces new capital at the rate G(1,m). Entrepreneurs account for any
additional growth in the capital stock. Since both aggregate capital and the population
7of entrepreneurs grow at the rate η,i tm u s tb et h a t
ηN = G(1,m)N + E(q/w)H. (5)
The balanced growth path is determined by solving (3)-(5) for N, l, m, q and w.A s -
suming capital is essential for producing consumption, N will be positive. Together
with E(q/w) ≥ 0 this implies η ≥ G(1,m), and then the assumption ρ > η ensures
ρ >G (1,m).
Suppose ﬁrst that the talent distribution is such that E(q/w)=0for low enough
q/w. That is, the supply of start-up capital dries up when the price of capital is low
enough. Then the balanced growth path may exhibit no investment in start-up capital
by entrepreneurs. Incumbent ﬁrms grow at the rate η and N is determined by initial con-
ditions. Although there is balanced growth, the ﬁrm size distribution is non-stationary:
the distribution of log capital shifts to the right as incumbent ﬁrms produce new capital
at a rate η.
Suppose instead that E(q/w) is strictly positive for all q/w positive. There are always
some entrepreneurs for whom it is proﬁtable to create new start-up capital. Then (5)
implies that the balanced growth path must be such that G(1,m)=μ < η.An a t u r a l
assumption is that G(1,0) is negative, and so μ n e e dn o tb ep o s i t i v ei ne q u i l i b r i u m .
Firms could enter and then shrink forever. Throughout the following, assume this is not
the case. Because μ < η, there is continuous entry of new ﬁrms. The number of ﬁrms,
as well as the number of entering ﬁrms, grows at the rate η.A tt i m et the number of
ﬁrms in the cohort of ﬁrms of age a is proportional to eη(t−a). The age distribution of
ﬁrms is therefore stationary, with a density ηe−ηa.A sn e wﬁrms all enter with one unit
of capital and accumulate capital at the common rate μ,aﬁrm of age a has na = eμa
units of capital. The size of a ﬁrm is a deterministic function of age. If μ is positive,
then changing variables from age to capital gives a distribution of ﬁrm size in terms of






for all n ∈ [1,∞).T h eﬁrm size distribution is Pareto. Since employment and output
scale with capital, this is true for any of these measures of ﬁrm size.
The right-tail probabilities of p(n) are n−ζ,w h e r eζ = η/μ. This implies the log-linear
relationship shown in Figure 2, and its slope reveals the tail index ζ of the distribution.
Because (5) implies η > μ when entry is positive, the tail index ζ is guaranteed to be
6Benhabib and Bisin [2006] trace this argument back to Cantelli and Fermi.
8above 1 if at any price there will be some entrepreneurs who choose to create start-
up capital. This ensures the size distribution has a ﬁnite mean, given by ζ/(ζ − 1).
Zipf’s law arises when ζ approaches 1 from above. But this limiting distribution is
not an equilibrium distribution in this economy. As seen above, without entry the size
distribution is non-stationary.
The fraction of all capital held by ﬁrms with more than n units of capital is n−(ζ−1),
which approaches 1 for any n as the equilibrium distribution approaches Zipf’s law. If the
smallest ﬁrm has one employee, then the fact that ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n5 0 0e m p l o y e e s
account for 50% of employment implies ζ =1+l n ( 2 ) /ln(500) = 1.11. An analogous
calculation for the 27% of employment accounted for by ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 0 , 0 0 0
employees yields the very similar ζ =1 .14,ar e ﬂection of the accuracy of the ﬁto ft h e
Pareto distribution in this range of the data.
The formula ζ = η/μ implies that μ must be close to the population growth rate.
In the United States this is approximately 1% per annum, and so ﬁrms in this economy
should grow at a rate of about .9% per annum. If new ﬁrms enter with one employee,
then one obtains the rather problematic implication that it takes ln(10,000)/.009 =
1,023 years to become one of the roughly 1,000 ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 0 , 0 0 0e m p l o y e e s
o b s e r v e di nU Sd a t a .
A further anomalous implication of this simple model is that there is no exit. In
U.S. data the exit rate is approximately 10% per annum. An easy ﬁxi st oa s s u m et h a t
ﬁrms die randomly, with all their capital, at a rate δ. The equilibrium conditions (3)-(5)
require only minor modiﬁcation: ρ must be replaced by ρ + δ in (3) and η by η + δ in
(5). The number of ﬁrms of age a at time t is proportional to eη(t−a)−δa,a n ds ot h ea g e
distribution has a density (η + δ)e−(η+δ)a. The resulting size distribution is Pareto with
at a i li n d e xζ =( η + δ)/μ. Population growth is no longer needed to obtain a Pareto
size distribution. What matters is that ﬁrms have a chance to grow. The resulting
distribution will ﬁt the empirical size distribution if μ is a little below η+δ.N o ww ec a n
have μ ≈ .1,a n dt h e nﬁr m st h a ts t a r tw i t ho n ee m p l o y e eo n l yt a k eln(10,000)/.1=9 2
years to reach 10,000 employees. This is closer to the median age of 75 years for ﬁrms
of 10,000 or more employees reported in Luttmer [2008]. But, as reported in Section 2,
the assumption that the likelihood of exit is independent of ﬁrm size is starkly at odds
with US data.
93.2 A Brownian Example
F i r ma g ea n dl o g a r i t h m i ce m p l o y m e n ts i z ea re positively correlated in US data. But
the correlation is far from perfect. A simple way to account for this is to introduce a
random component to ﬁrm growth. Speciﬁcally, assume the capital stock of a particular
ﬁrm evolves according to
dnt = nt [G(1,m t)dt + σdWt], (6)
where Wt is a ﬁrm-speciﬁcs t a n d a r dB r o w n i a nm o t i o na n dmt is the amount of labor
used to produce new capital, per unit of existing capital. The Brownian component of
(6) amounts to a common multiplicative shock to all the units of capital inside the ﬁrm.
This is still a technology that exhibits constant returns to scale. But ﬁrm boundaries
matter, in the sense that re-allocating a unit of capital from one ﬁrm to another exposes
that unit of capital to diﬀerent shocks.
Along a balanced growth path, rt = ρ, wt = w, and the value of a ﬁrm with n units













The constant-returns-to-scale assumptions imposed on F and G immediately suggest a
solution of the form Q(n)=qn. With this conjecture, the Bellman equation reduces to
the balanced growth version of the deterministic Bellman equation (2). The result is a
constant mt = m, and this implies that ﬁrm growth satisﬁes Gibrat’s law, in a strict
sense: for any ∆ > 0, the distribution of nt+∆/nt is independent of ﬁrm size nt,a n do f
anything else. Conditions (3)-(5) continue to deﬁne the balanced growth path.
To compute the size distribution, apply Ito’s lemma to (6) to conclude that the drift
of ln(nt) is equal to μ = G(1,m) − σ2/2. The log-size distribution of a cohort of age
a is normal with mean μa and variance σ2a. If the balanced growth path is such that
η = G(1,m), then there is no entry. If all ﬁrms are initially the same, then the size
distribution along the balanced growth path is log normal with mean (N/H)+μt and
variance σ2t. There is no stationary size distribution in that case. In contrast to the
deterministic example, scaling ﬁrm size with an exponential trend does not make the
size distribution stationary.
If G(1,m) < η then there is positive entry and the age distribution will have a density
ηe−ηa along the balanced growth path. Integrating the normal density for log size given
age against this exponential age density and converting the resulting density for log size
































Another way to show this result is to use the fact that the density f of s =l n ( n) satisﬁes
the Kolmogorov forward equation ηf(s)=−μDf(s)+1
2σ2D2f(s) for all s, except at
the entry point s =0 . T h ed e n s i t yi sc o n t i n u o u sa tt h a tp o i n t ,b u tt h e r ei sak i n k
η = 1
2σ2[D−f(0) − D+f(0)] that reﬂects the entry that takes place at s =0 .T h e
remaining boundary conditions are that f is positive and integrates to 1.N o t e t h a t
G(1,m) < η implies μ + σ2/2 < η. This inequality is equivalent to ζ > 1,w h i c hi s
precisely the condition needed to ensure that the mean ﬁrm size, ζζ∗/(ζ −1)(ζ∗ +1),i s
ﬁnite. The tail index ζ approaches 1 from above as μ + σ2/2 increases towards η.
A l lt h i si sp r e d i c a t e do nη > 0. But, if there is also random exit at a rate δ,t h e n
η must be replaced by η + δ in the above calculations, and one only needs to assume
η + δ > 0.
3.3 Stochastic Replication
Taking organization capital to be continuous makes for easy calculations but does not
aid interpretation. Organizations can be viewed as collections of matches, contracts, or
trading relationships, that are more naturally taken to be discrete. One is an employee,
supplier, or customer of a ﬁrm, or one is not. Large ﬁrms typically operate many plants,
oﬃces or stores that are geographically dispersed. In the following, the discrete units
that make up organization capital are referred to generically as “blueprints.” Firm
growth is about the replication of these blueprints.
3.3.1 Independent Replication
Entrepreneurs create a start-up “blueprint” that deﬁnes a new ﬁrm. This blueprint can
be replicated within the ﬁrm, and every resulting blueprint can itself be replicated inside
the ﬁrm. Let nt ∈ N denote the number of blueprints of the ﬁrm. Consumption produced



















,w h e r eΦ is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function. A recent application can be found in Arkolakis [2009].
11by a ﬁrm with nt blueprints is again F(nt,n tlt),w h e r elt is production labor used per
blueprint. Combining mt units of labor with a blueprint generates a new blueprint at a
Poisson rate G(1,m t).I nt h i se x a m p l e ,G will be assumed to be strictly positive. The
Bellman equation is again (2) and the economy will have a balanced growth path deﬁned
by (3)-(5). Write μ = G(1,m) for the rate at which blueprints are replicated.
Let {pn,a}n∈N denote the probability distribution of the number of blueprints of a
ﬁrm at age a. These probabilities satisfy the diﬀerential equations
Dp1,a = −μp1,a, Dpn+1,a = μnpn,a − μ(n +1 ) pn+1,a, n ∈ N,( 9 )
and the initial condition is p1,0 =1 . Clearly, p1,a = e−μa a n do n ec a nt h e np r o c e e dt o




−μan−1 , n ∈ N.( 1 0 )
Observe that the mean of this distribution is eμa, as expected. There may again be a bal-
a n c e dg r o w t hp a t hw i t hn oe n t r yi fe n t r e p r e n e u r ss t o pc r e a t i n gn e wﬁrms at suﬃciently
low blueprint prices. As in the Brownian example, the resulting size distribution is non-
stationary, and there is no way to de-trend ﬁrm size to make it stationary. A stationary
distribution arises if the entry rate is positive, so that η > μ. The age distribution again















There are several ways to calculate this integral. One is to change variables to x = e−b
and recognize the result as the beta function with parameters 1+η/μ and n. Another is
to expand (1−e−b)n−1 using the binomial formula and do the integration term by term.







for all n ∈ N.H e r e , Γ is the gamma function, which specializes to Γ(x)=( x − 1)!
for integer values of x. The result (11) is due to Yule [1925] and Simon [1955]. The
process that gives rise to (11) is widely known as the Yule process (Feller [1968], Karlin
and Taylor [1975], or Ross [1996].) Integrating the mean eμa of ﬁrm size given age
against the age density ηe−ηa s h o w st h a t( 1 1 )m u s th a v eam e a nη/(η − μ). Stirling’s
formula implies that n! ∼ nn+1
2e−n and thus pn ∼ n−(1+η/μ). To compute the right-tail
probabilities, note that they are (1 − e−μa)n−1 for a cohort of age a. Averaging against















A Zipf plot for this distribution is log-linear for large n,w i t has l o p e−η/μ < −1.Z i p f ’ s
Law arises as μ ↑ η,w h i c hg i v e spn =1 /[n(n +1 ) ]and right-tail probabilities equal to
1/n.
Stochastic Depreciation The Yule process implies that ﬁrms can only grow. A
natural generalization is to allow individual blueprints to depreciate in one-hoss-shay
f a s h i o na ts o m er a t eλ,w h e r eλ may depend on labor assigned to “maintain” blueprints.
A ﬁrm exits when it loses its last blueprint and therefore has no blueprints that can
be replicated anymore. The conditions for a balanced growth path are similar to (3)-
(4) and will imply that η > μ − λ if there is positive entry. Firm size follows a simple
birth-death process that is a special case of the more general time-dependent birth-death
process studied in Kendall [1948]. Conditional on survival, the cohort size distribution
is again geometric as in (10), but the variable 1 − e−μa in (10) must be replaced by
(e(μ−λ)a−1)/(e(μ−λ)a−λ/μ). Although the population of ﬁrms grows exponentially, exit
is highly size-dependent: only the ﬁrms with one remaining blueprint can exit. This
seems to be closer to US data than random exit. A characterization of the stationary
size and age distributions (no longer exponential) can be found in Luttmer [2008]. The
right-tail probabilities of the size distribution behave like n−ζ with ζ = η/(μ − λ) when
μ > λ. The thick right tail observed in the data arises when ﬁrms are expected to grow
at a positive rate.
3.3.2 Synchronized Replication
In the case of the Yule process and its birth-death generalization with constant μ and λ,
replication and decay are independent across blueprints. All randomness in ﬁrm growth
arises at the blueprint level. At the opposite extreme, consider a replication technology
with the feature that the random event of replication is perfectly synchronized across all
blueprints within the same ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, suppose a synchronized replication event
occurs at a Poisson rate G(n,nm) if a ﬁrm with n blueprints uses nm units of labor to
attempt replication. The arrival of such a synchronized replication event generates n
new blueprints, and the cost of replication is proportional to n. Because of this, just as
13in the Brownian example, the value of a ﬁrm with n blueprints is still linear in n.T h e
Bellman equation (2) holds. The balanced growth conditions are again given by (3)-(5).
As before, write μ = G(1,m).
Measured in numbers of blueprints, the possible ﬁrm sizes are now 2s,f o ra l ls+1 ∈ N.
For a ﬁrm with n blueprints, the variable s =l o g 2(n) measures the number of replications
that have occurred since the ﬁrm was set up. Along a balanced growth path, the
distribution of the number of replications in a cohort of age a satisﬁes
Dp0,a = −μp0,a, Dps+1,a = μps,a − μps+1,a, s +1∈ N.







for all s +1∈ N. This is, of course, the Poisson distribution with mean μa.A si na l l
previous examples, there are now two possibilities that depend on whether entrepreneurs
create new ﬁrms or not. If they do not, and all ﬁrms have one blueprint at time t =0 ,
then the distribution of log ﬁrm size will be Poisson with mean μt at time t. Alternatively,
if μ < η, then the age distribution of ﬁrms has the exponential density ηe−ηa. Combining













for all s +1∈ N. Thus log size is geometrically distributed. The right-tail probabilities











for all n on the grid 2s, s +1∈ N. On this grid, these right-tail probabilities converge
to 1/n as μ ↑ η, just as in the case of the Yule process. Obviously, the sample paths
of ﬁrm size are extremely unrealistic in this example. But it illustrates, together with
the independent replication example, how a thick-tailed size distribution can arise from
replication acting at diﬀerent levels of aggregation within the ﬁrm.
3.4 The Spin-oﬀ Interpretation
When ﬁrms can grow forever, the key ingredient in generating a stationary size distri-
bution is entry. In all examples presented above, the amount of entry depends on how
14many agents have a comparative advantage in creating blueprints from scratch versus
using the replication technology available to incumbent ﬁrms. In Chatterjee and Rossi-
Hansberg [2007], the amount of entry depends instead on the incentives of an employee
to report or sell an idea to his employer, versus keeping the idea and using it to start a
new ﬁrm. Related, in Franco and Filson [2006] employees can start new ﬁrms by copying
from their employers.
To show the mechanics, consider the independent replication economy of Section
3.3.1 and suppose that no blueprints can be created from scratch. Rather, among the
blueprints created within the ﬁrm, a fraction 1 − α become spin-oﬀs. Because there
are no independent entrepreneurs, the equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) have to be
replaced by N(l + m)=1and η = G(1,m). One can view (3) as determining l and m
as functions of the wage w, and then these modiﬁed equilibrium conditions determine
N and w. The rate at which the aggregate number of blueprints grows is still η.B u t
t h ef a c tt h a taf r a c t i o n1 − α of all new blueprints are spin-oﬀs means that the rate
at which ﬁrms accumulate blueprints is μ = αη ∈ (0,η). The remaining newly created
blueprints are the seeds of new ﬁrms, and hence the ﬂow of new ﬁrms grows at the rate
η.T h e ﬁrm age distribution is again exponential, and hence the size distribution will
be (11). This spin-oﬀ interpretation is a direct translation of the way Yule [1925, p. 24]
constructed his distribution: within a species, every individual replicates at the rate η,
and occasionally a mutation occurs that generates a new species.
3.5 Heterogeneous Organization Capital
Luttmer [2008] combines independent replication of blueprints with heterogeneity in
blueprint quality. In a competitive version of the model, output of a quality-z blueprint
is zF(1,l).N e wﬁrms are created with a frontier blueprint quality z = Zt,w h e r eZt grows
at some exogenous rate θ. Blueprint quality continues to follow the frontier, but a ﬁrm
and all its blueprints may experience a one-time reduction in quality at some random
time, following an exponentially distributed waiting time with mean 1/δ.A sb e f o r e ,a l l
blueprints can be replicated at rates G(1,m),w h e r em is labor. New blueprints are exact
copies of the blueprints from which they were produced. When the ﬁrm-wide reduction
in quality occurs, incentives to replicate and maintain blueprints are reduced, and this
slows down the growth rate of the ﬁrm. The Bellman equation (2) requires only minor
modiﬁcation and ﬁr m sg r o wa te i t h e rh i g ho rl o wc o n s t a n tr a t e sa l o n gab a l a n c e dg r o w t h
path. If fast-growing ﬁrms gain and lose blueprints at rates μ and λ, then the tail index
of the size distribution is ζ =( η +δ)/(μ−λ), provided that μ > λ and the distribution
15of slow-growing ﬁrms does not have an even thicker tail. The combination of rapid
initial growth and slower long-term growth allows one to account for the fact that the
median age of US ﬁrms with 10,000 or more employees is only about 75 years, without
the random exit assumption and its anomalous implication for the size of exiting ﬁrms.
In the resulting account of the data, Gibrat’s law does not hold. But an econometrician
running short panel regressions of growth rates on size would ﬁnd that Gibrat’s law
holds except for small ﬁrms, as in Evans [1987] and Hall [1987].
3.5.1 Obsolescence
An alternative way to account for the slowdown in ﬁrm growth, inspired by the vintage
capital model of Hopenhayn [2007], is as follows. Instead of the one-time reduction in
quality, suppose that frontier blueprints stop tracking the frontier altogether after an
exponentially distributed waiting time with mean 1/δ.
The Bellman equation (2) now requires a more substantial modiﬁcation. At time t,
let Qt be the value of a blueprint at the frontier, and write qv,t for the value of a blueprint
with a productivity that stopped growing at time v ≤ t. Along a balanced growth path,
wages are wt = weθt and the interest rate is rt = ρ + θ.C o n j e c t u r e Qt = Qeθt and
qv,t = q(t − v)eθt. The Bellman equation for Q is then
ρQ =m a x
l,m
{ZF(1,l)+QG(1,m) − w(l + m)} + δ[q(0) − Q], (13)





−θaF(1,l)+q(a)G(1,m) − w(l + m)

+D q(a). (14)
This implies that frontier blueprints are replicated at a rate G(1,M),w h e r eM attains
the maximum in (13). Blueprints behind the frontier will be replicated at slower rates,
if at all. If the marginal product D2F(1,0) is ﬁnite, then there will be a ﬁnite age A,
measured since the time a blueprint’s productivity stopped growing, at which a blueprint
becomes obsolete. For example, if F(1,l)=m i n {1,l} then the age of obsolescence is
A =l n ( Z/w)/θ.
Suppose that D2F(1,0) is indeed ﬁnite and that the blueprints that can be created
by entrepreneurs are so far behind the frontier as to make them obsolete. Then all new
blueprints are produced from the existing stock of blueprints. Along a balanced growth
path, G(1,M)=η + δ, so that the population of frontier blueprints grows at the rate
η.S i n c eM is a function only of wages, this equilibrium condition determines the level
16of wages. Given the replication rates implied by (14), it is not diﬃcult to calculate the
productivity distribution of blueprints behind the frontier. The equilibrium number of
blueprints then follows from clearing the labor market using the employment decision
rules implied by (13)-(14).
3.5.2 Endogenous Growth
It is easy to turn this into a model of endogenous growth by letting owners of improvable
blueprints employ u units of labor per blueprint to improve the productivity of individual
blueprints at a rate θ = R(1,u),w h e r eR is a constant-returns-to-scale production
function. Blueprints cease to be improvable at a rate δ. As in Boldrin and Levine [2002],
a blueprint of a particular productivity level is an input in producing a blueprint of a
higher quality level. The technology exhibits constant returns to scale. The incentives
to improve blueprints are the same for all blueprints at the frontier that can still be
improved, and so all frontier blueprints will be improved at a common rate. This will
also be the growth rate of wages and per-capita consumption in the economy. Aggregate
growth is driven entirely by the incentives of owners of frontier blueprints to improve
the quality of their blueprints.
The spin-oﬀ device of Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg [2007] can now be used to
obtain a ﬁrm size distribution with the Pareto-like tail observed in the data. As above,
let a ﬁrm be a collection of blueprints produced from a common spin-oﬀ blueprint. A
frontier ﬁrm generates spin-oﬀsa tt h er a t e(1−α)G(1,M). Suppose all blueprints within
a ﬁrm stop growing in productivity at the same time. Then employment at ﬁrms with
frontier blueprints grows at the average rate αG(1,M), and the age distribution of ﬁrms
with frontier blueprints will have a density (η + δ)e−(η+δ)a. The size distribution of all
ﬁrms at the frontier is again a Yule distribution, with a tail index ζ =1 /α.S i n c eﬁrms
that can no longer keep up with the frontier exit in ﬁnite time, frontier ﬁrms dominate
the right tail of the size distribution. In this economy, large ﬁrms are ﬁrms that have
been at the frontier of productivity growth for a long time.
3.6 Multiproduct Firms
It has been assumed up to now that every ﬁrm produces the same good for a competitive
market. Diﬀerent blueprints describe, for example, diﬀerent production lines, plants or
stores.
Alternatively, Klette and Kortum [2004] consider an economy, based on the quality-
ladder model of Grossman and Helpman [1991], in which ﬁrm size is a reﬂection of
17the number of diﬀerent products a ﬁrm sells. Recall that in Grossman and Helpman
[1991] there is a unit measure of distinct commodities at every point in time. There is a
constant population of consumers who have logarithmic preferences. Potential producers
in a given market each own a blueprint that describes a linear labor-only technology for
producing at a certain level of quality. The producer with the highest quality in a given
market takes the whole market by setting a price that reduces the potential proﬁts of the
producer with the next highest quality to zero. Entrepreneurs can use labor to create a
blueprint with a discrete multiplicative quality improvement over that of the incumbent,
at some Poisson rate. Upon the arrival of an improved blueprint, the owner of the new
blueprint takes over the market. The combination of an evenly spaced quality ladder (in
logs) and logarithmic utility implies that proﬁts in a particular market are independent
of quality.
Klette and Kortum [2004] modify this economy by allowing an incumbent in one
market to combine m units of labor with the incumbent’s blueprint for that market to
generate a blueprint for a randomly selected alternative market, at some Poisson rate
G(1,m). Just as with blueprints created by entrepreneurs, the quality of the blueprint
is a discrete multiplicative improvement over the one being used in that market. A
ﬁrm is a collection of blueprints for diﬀerent markets, and ﬁrm size can be measured
by the number of markets n ∈ N in which it operates. Along a balanced growth path
μ = G(1,m) for all incumbent producers, and there will be some positive ﬂow ν of
markets taken over by entrepreneurs. Since there is a unit measure of markets, this
implies that incumbents lose markets at a rate λ = μ + ν.L e t pn be the stationary
distribution of ﬁrm size. Requiring the ﬂows in and out of a state n to add up to zero
gives 0=λ2p2 − (μ + λ)p1 + ν and 0=μ(n − 1)pn−1 + λ(n +1 ) pn+1 − (μ + λ)npn for
all n+1∈ N. This can be written as (n+1)pn+1 −npn =( μ/λ)[npn −(n−1)pn−1] and
then one can use npn = −
S∞








The problem with this distribution is that its right tail is even thinner than that of a
geometric distribution. It behaves like (μ/λ)n instead of n−ζ for some ζ. The underlying
reason is that ﬁrms in this economy cannot grow on average: the number of markets is
ﬁxed and positive entry means that the average incumbent has to lose markets.
Random exit can save the day. If ﬁrms exit from all their markets at some positive
rate δ,t h e nλ = μ − δ + ν and hence μ − λ = δ − ν will be positive if δ is large enough
relative to the rate at which entrepreneurs take over markets. Firms can grow conditional
18on survival, and the size distribution will then have a tail index ζ = δ/(μ−λ). As noted
before, a diﬃculty with this solution is that there will be a lot of exit of large ﬁrms.
An alternative is to assume that the productivity of a ﬁrm’s replication technology is
high for new ﬁrms and drops to a lower level following some exponentially distributed
waiting time with mean 1/δ.
In the monopolistic competition version of Luttmer [2008], distinct blueprints also
describe new products that can be produced using a linear labor-only technology. But
no two products in the economy are perfect substitutes. Preferences are as in Dixit
and Stiglitz [1977] and the number of goods can grow over time. Because of this, new
products created by one ﬁrm do not imply the elimination of a product by another
ﬁrm. When there is population growth at a rate η, the total number of products in the
economy will grow at the same rate η along a balanced growth path. Hence positive
ﬁrm growth and positive entry can go together, resulting in the tail index ζ = η/(μ−λ)
reported above.8
3.7 Networks, Search and Matching
Replication of organization capital across distinct locations is a natural interpretation
of ﬁrm growth. In the models considered so far, the only link between diﬀerent units of
the ﬁrm comes at the investment stage: existing units can be used to create more units.
Removing a particular unit of the ﬁrm has no eﬀect on how the others function. This
is very diﬀe r e n tf r o mv i e w i n gal a r g eﬁrm as an integrated network. Other parts of a
hub-and-spoke airline will be aﬀected when one of its hubs goes down. The model of
WalMart in Holmes [2009] has an integrated distribution network at its core. It is quite
likely that these types of ﬁrms are heavily represented among the largest ﬁrms we see
in the data.
The accumulation of new “blueprints” need not be the result of ﬁrm investment.
An important and complementary alternative is product or labor market search. If
consumers choose to purchase from suppliers not by randomly sampling ﬁrms but by
randomly sampling other consumers and following their example (Steindl [1965]), then a
ﬁrm will gain customers in proportion to how many customers it already has. Similarly,
if workers ﬁnd jobs by contacting other workers (Rees [1966], Granovetter [1974], Bur-
dett and Vishwanath [1988]), then employers will ﬁnd new employees in proportion to
how many workers they already have. This is known as preferential attachment in the
8Bernard, Redding and Schott [2006] present detailed evidence on the importance of turnover in the
products produced by US manufacturing ﬁrms.
19literature on network formation. Gibrat’s law is a natural outcome and positive entry
will produce a Yule-type distribution (Luttmer [2006]). The extensive literature on this
topic is presented in Jackson [2008].
3.8 Growth Rate Variances and Aggregate Fluctuations
The independent and synchronous replication examples have very diﬀerent implications
for the variance of ﬁrm growth. In the case of the Yule process, a ﬁrm of size nt expands
to size nt+1with a probability approximately equal to μnt∆ over a small period of time
∆. Therefore Et[(nt+∆ − nt)/nt]/∆ → μ and vart[(nt+∆ − nt)/nt]/∆ → μ/nt as ∆ goes
to zero. Firm growth rates satisfy Gibrat’s law in a weak sense: only the mean growth
rate is independent of size. The realized growth rate of a ﬁrm of size n is, roughly, the
sample average of nt independent and identically distributed random variables. Such a
sample average has a variance that behaves like 1/nt.9
In the case of synchronized replication, a ﬁrm of size nt expands to size 2nt with
a probability approximately equal to μ∆ over a small period of time ∆. Therefore
Et[(nt+∆ − nt)/nt]/∆ → μ and vart[(nt+∆ − nt)/nt]/∆ → μ as ∆ goes to zero. Since
replication events aﬀect the ﬁrm as a whole, the variance of the growth rate of the ﬁrm
is also independent of ﬁr ms i z e ,j u s ta si ti si nt h eB r o w n i a ne x a m p l e .
The data seem to be somewhere in between these two extremes. Hymer and Pashigian
[1962] long ago noted that the standard deviation of ﬁrm growth seems to decline with
size but not as fast as 1/
√
n. More recently, Stanley et al. [1996] report a standard
deviation that behaves like 1/n1/6 for Compustat employment data. Davis et al. [2006]
study growth rate variances over time for both Compustat and Census data. For the
year 2000, they report a Compustat sample of only about 8,500 employer ﬁrms with an
average employment of around 5,300 employees, whereas their Census data set has about
4.7 million ﬁrms with an average employment of 18 employees. The respective growth
rate standard deviations for 2000 are about .25 and .4 (Davis et al. [2006] Figure 6). In
the context of the simple examples given here, the randomness that aﬀects replication
must be neither completely dependent nor fully independent across blueprints. More
generally, growth rate shocks may occur at diﬀerent levels of aggregation within the ﬁrm.
Interesting suggestions for models that can account for this can be found in Stanley et
al. [1996] and Sutton [2002].
9Feller [1951] pointed out that certain branching processes, such as the Yule process, can be approx-
imated for large nt by the diﬀusion dnt = μntdt + σ
√
ntdWt, which implies the growth rate variance
σ2/nt.
20As pointed out by Gabaix [2009], the rate at which growth rate variances decline
with ﬁrm size has implications for aggregate ﬂuctuations when one moves away from
the abstraction that there is a continuum of ﬁrms. To illustrate, ignore the fact that
labor supply is completely inelastic in the formal model presented here. In the example
of independent replication across blueprints, ﬁrm boundaries do not aﬀect aggregate
o u t c o m e s ,a n dt h er a t ea tw h i c hac o l l e c t i o no fNt blueprints grows has a variance that
behaves like 1/Nt. For the whole economy, Nt will be very large and the aggregate growth
rate will have a negligible variance. But in the case of synchronous replication, a ﬁrm
j with nj,t blueprints will have a growth rate variance of vart [(nj,t+∆ − nj,t)/nj,t] ≈ μ∆,
and hence the number of blueprints in a collection of Jt independent ﬁrms grows at a
















The coeﬃcient multiplying μ∆ is the Herﬁndahl index for {nj,t}
Jt
j=1. Given the distribu-
tion of log size (12), the mean of n =2 s is 1/(1−μ/η) and this is well deﬁned and ﬁnite
as long as there is entry. The mean of n2 =2 2s is 1/(1 − 3μ/η) if η/μ > 3 and inﬁnite
otherwise. This corresponds to a tail index ζ =l o g 2(1 + η/μ) > 2.T h u sf o rζ > 2 the
Herﬁndahl index behaves like 1/Jt, and this will be very small since the number of ﬁrms
is large. But if ζ ∈ (1,2), then the average of {n2
j,t}
Jt
j=1 does not converge as Jt becomes
large and the Herﬁndahl index will not behave like 1/Jt. Gabaix [2009] shows that the
variance of aggregate growth behaves like 1/J
2(1−1/ζ)
t for ζ ∈ (1,2] and 1/(2ln(Jt)) in
the ζ ↓ 1 limit. The data support ζ close to 1,a n df o r6 million ﬁrms, 1/Jt ≈ 1.67×10−7
while 1/(2ln(Jt)) ≈ .032.10
4. Hhwhurjhqhrxv Purgxfwlylw|
Replication is a powerful and natural logic that can explain exponential growth in orga-
nization capital, and hence Gibrat’s law. A similar logic is far from clear when it comes
to productivity growth. As Solow [2005, p.10] notes in the context of aggregate growth,
exponential growth “ought to require much more convincing justiﬁcation than it gets
in the standard models of endogenous technological change or accumulation of human
capital.” Special functional forms such as the Cobb-Douglas production function (as
10In Durlauf [1993] and Conley and Dupor [2003] aggregate ﬂuctuations are aﬀected by sources of
correlation that have nothing to do with ﬁrm boundaries.
21in Lucas [1978]) or the constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility function also play an
unfortunate but central role in deriving Gibrat’s law.11
The heterogeneous productivity economies surveyed in this section are based on the
Dixit-Stiglitz model of diﬀerentiated commodities produced by monopolistic competi-
tors, as in Luttmer [2007]. One advantage of this formulation is that it allows for shifts
in tastes across diﬀerentiated commodities to play a role in accounting for heterogeneity
across ﬁrms. But many of the observable implications also apply to models with ﬁrms
that produce for a competitive output market using a Cobb-Douglas technology with a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed factor. Recent examples are Atkeson and Kehoe [2005] and Luttmer
[2009].
As before, ﬂow utility is a logarithmic function of composite consumption, and dy-
nastic consumers discount utility ﬂows at the rate ρ. The population of consumers in
the economy is Ht = Heηt and everyone has one unit of eﬀort per unit of time. The
population growth rate η is non-negative.
4.1 Product Market Equilibrium
Every period, there are many diﬀerentiated commodities and preferences are as in Dixit
and Stiglitz [1977]. The type of a commodity is a state variable z that can be interpreted
as quality. The measure of commodities with a quality level at or below z is At[z] at
time t. The technology and market structure will be such that all commodities of the
same quality z trade at the same price pt[z]. As a result, all commodities of quality






















All commodities are produced by monopolist producers using the labor-only linear
technology yt[z]=lt[z].L e twt b et h ew a g ei nu n i t so fﬁnal output. Monopolist produc-
11Houthakker [1955-1956] shows how the Cobb-Douglas production function can arise from a Leontief
technology and Pareto productivities. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1992] show how CES utility can
be derived from Fréchet taste parameters. Exactly how this might ﬁt together with the size distribution
of ﬁrms, or perhaps the distribution of consumer wealth, remains an open question.
22ers set pt[z] equal to 1/(1 − 1/γ) times the marginal cost of commodity z. This yields
pt[z]=Ptwt/(1 − 1/γ) and the deﬁnition of Pt then implies

















Note that Qt is the CES price index applied to prices 1/z and the probability measure
At[z]/Nt. Using the demand curves, the constant markup over marginal cost, and the
equilibrium real wage, it is easy to see that real revenues for a type-z producer are
(z/Qt)γ−1Ct/Nt.A f r a c t i o n 1 − 1/γ of real revenues goes to labor and the remaining




















Employment, proﬁts, and revenues all scale with (z/Qt)γ−1. When commodities are
almost perfect substitutes, tiny quality diﬀerences lead to large size diﬀerences.
Let Lt denote the aggregate amount of labor used to produce diﬀerentiated com-






Aggregate consumption increases one for one with average quality and labor, and the
elasticity with respect to the number of goods is (1/γ)/(1 − 1/γ).
Everything now depends on how At[z] evolves over time.
4.2 One-World Melitz [2003]
The simplest example one can imagine is a closed-economy and continuous-time version
of Melitz [2003]. In contrast to the initial example of Section 3, labor and entrepreneurial
eﬀort are perfect substitutes in this economy. Anyone can hire λE > 0 units of labor to
generate entry opportunities at a unit Poisson rate. An entry opportunity results in a
draw of a quality level z from a time-invariant distribution of entry qualities. If entry
occurs, this quality level will remain constant, until it drops to zero forever, resulting
in exit. This happens following an exponentially distributed waiting time. In addition,
quality must be “maintained” at a ﬂow cost of λF > 0 units of labor, or else quality
23drops to zero permanently, again resulting in exit. The resulting ﬂow proﬁts vt[z]−wtλF
are determined by (15)-(17).
There is no population growth. Together with the time-invariant entry distribution,
this gives rise to a balanced growth path with no growth. Firm numbers, average quality,
and wages are constant. As a result, proﬁts are constant and entry opportunities result
in actual entry if and only if the quality draw z from the entry distribution is such
that vt[z] − wtλF is positive. The employment size distribution of ﬁr m si sc o m p l e t e l y
determined by the quality distribution from which potential entrants draw, truncated at
the lowest z for which proﬁts are non-negative. If the entry productivity distribution is
Pareto with a tail index α, then the employment size distribution of ﬁrms will be Pareto
with tail index ζ = α/(γ − 1). This results in well-deﬁned aggregates if and only if,
somehow, α > γ − 1.
In this economy, all size diﬀerences are attributed to random draws that happen
right before ﬁrms enter. In US data, most new ﬁrms are very small, and substantial
size diﬀerences appear only over time. This makes calibration diﬃcult. In particular,
estimates of the cost of entry are likely to be biased upward to a signiﬁcant extent, as
entrepreneurs do not anticipate uncertain growth but expect to become an average ﬁrm
right upon entry. Entry amounts to hitting the jackpot in this economy: given that ζ is
close to 1,t h ea v e r a g eﬁrm will be very large.
4.3 Stochastic Productivity Growth
Consider the following modiﬁcation of the Melitz [2003] economy. The technology for
generating entry opportunities is the same, but instead of drawing from some time-
invariant quality distribution, anyone with an entry opportunity at time t can start with
a common but time-dependent entry quality Zt = ZeθEt. Following entry at time t,
quality zt,a evolves with ﬁrm age a according to
dln(zt,a)=θIda + σIdWa,( 1 8 )
where {Wa}a≥0 is a Brownian motion that is independent across ﬁrms. For now, both
θE and θI are taken as parameters. As before, a ﬁxed cost of λF units of labor is required
to keep the ﬁrm alive.
4.3.1 Balanced Growth
We are interested in versions of this economy that have a balanced growth path with a
stationary employment size distribution. Conjecture that Lt/Ht is constant along such a
24balanced growth path, so that constant shares of the labor force are used for producing
diﬀerentiated commodities and for paying entry and ﬁxed costs. The employment size
distribution can then only be stationary if Nt/Ht is constant. Since the labor share
wtLt/Ct is constant, it follows that Ct/(wtNt) is constant, and hence a stationary em-
ployment size distribution corresponds to a stationary distribution for z/Qt,b y( 1 6 ) .I n
particular, Zt/Qt must be constant. Entry and average quality must grow at the same
rate θE. Together with (15), (17), and the fact that the number of ﬁrms grows at the
rate η, this implies that wages and per-capita consumption grow at a rate κ given by






That is, growth is driven by a combination of entry productivity growth and gains
in variety that result from increases in the number of ﬁr m s . T h er a t eo fi n c u m b e n t
productivity growth θI p l a y sn or o l ei nd e t e r m i n i n gt h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h i se c o n o m y .
It remains to determine if there is indeed a stationary size distribution when the
number of ﬁrms grows at the rate η and wages and aggregate consumption grow at the
rate κ given in (19).
4.3.2 Exit and Entry Decisions














This represents variable proﬁts of a type-z ﬁrm at time t,m e a s u r e di nu n i t so fl a b o r ,
relative to the ﬁxed cost of continuing a ﬁrm. For entrants, st[Zt]=S is a constant. As
the ﬁrm ages, st[zt−a,a]=sa evolves with age according to dsa = μda + σdWa,w h e r e
[μ,σ]=( γ − 1)[θI − θE,σI]. (21)
Using the tools presented in Dixit and Pindyck [1994], one can verify that the optimal
policy is to exit when sa falls below some threshold B<S . The resulting market value
of a ﬁrm in state s at time t is wtλFV (s),w h e r eV (s) satisﬁes the Bellman equation
ρV (s)=e






for all s ≥ B, together with two boundary conditions: V (B)=0and the requirement
that V (s) is bounded above by a multiple of es.T h i sd i ﬀerential equation can be solved
25explicitly. The result is an increasing and convex value function with an asymptote that
is linear in es when s becomes large.
E n t r ym u s tb es u c ht h a tλE ≥ λFV (S), with equality if entry is positive. Conve-
niently, the function V (·) only depends on the rate parameters ρ, μ,a n dσ2.T h u s ,
λE = λFV (S) determines S if entry is positive.
4.3.3 The Stationary Size Distribution
The number of ﬁrms in state s is now f(s)Nt,w h e r ef(s) is a probability density on
[B,∞).I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h eﬂow of ﬁrms that exit at the barrier B is 1
2σ2Df(B)Nt.
For the number of ﬁrms to grow at the rate η,i tm u s tb et h a tt h ee n t r yr a t ei sε = η +
1
2σ2Df(B). The density f satisﬁes the Kolmogorov forward equation ηf(s)=−μDf(s)+
1
2σ2D2f(s) for all s ∈ (B,S)∪(S,∞). The density is continuous at S, but it has a kink
because of entry. The remaining boundary conditions are f(B)=0and the requirements















where ζ and ζ∗ are deﬁned in (8).
This is essentially the same result as (7), except that the support of (22) has a ﬁnite
lower bound B,w h e r e a st h es =l n ( n) v e r s i o no f( 7 )w o u l dh a v es u p p o r t(−∞,∞).
In fact, the same distribution would arise here if there were no ﬁxed cost. The two
distributions are the same conditional on s ≥ S.T h e d i ﬀerence only shows up below
S,a n dS must be small because entering ﬁrms are small. Thus diﬀerences between (7)
and (22) only appear for very small ﬁrms. The real payoﬀ of the current formulation is
that it has a better prediction about where most of the exit we see in the data should
be observed: at the very low end of the distribution.
As in (7) the condition for es, and thus ﬁrm employment, to have a ﬁnite mean is
ζ > 1, or equivalently, μ + 1
2σ2 < η.S i n c eﬁrm employment is lt[z] ∝ est[z], this simply
says that the mean employment growth rate of incumbent ﬁrms not at the exit barrier is
less than the population growth rate. Incumbent productivity cannot grow too fast. In
contrast to (7), the diﬃculty is now that there is no equilibrium condition that ensures
this will be the case. Furthermore, there is no explanation for why ζ is close to 1 in the
data.
264.3.4 No Fixed Costs
If there are no ﬁxed costs, a balanced growth path exists even if μ + 1
2σ2 ≥ η.I nt h a t
case, the number of ﬁrms is whatever it is at the initial date, Lt = Ht,a n dw a g e sa n d












The left-hand side is just the growth rate of Qt when incumbent ﬁrms never exit and
there is no entry, and the right-hand side is the growth rate that arises when there is
non-trivial entry along the balanced growth path. Multiplying both sides by γ − 1 and
using the deﬁnitions (21) of μ and σ2 shows that this inequality is just μ + 1
2σ2 ≥ η.
In this economy, wages are driven up by rapid productivity growth among incumbents,
and entry productivity cannot keep up. Aggregate growth is now entirely determined
by how fast incumbents grow.
Although there is a balanced growth path, the size distribution is no longer stationary
but spreads out forever. If all ﬁrms happen to be the same at the initial date, then the
distribution of log employment is simply normal with a mean and variance that are
linear in time. The employment size distribution of U.S. ﬁrms is certainly very diﬀerent
now from what it was a century or two ago, and this type of spreading out may in fact
account for what happened during the early part of the twentieth century. But this
steady spreading out is hard to reconcile with data for recent decades.12
4.3.5 Trade
Firms in the economy just described pay an entry cost once and can then sell to all
consumers. One can imagine there are geographically distinct markets, and that entry
into each requires a market-speciﬁc entry cost. Irarrazabal and Opromolla [2008] do this
in a two-country world. In their economy, ﬁrms can enter the domestic market at one
cost and pay another cost to enter the foreign market. As usual, shipping to the foreign
market is also subject to iceberg transportation cost and labor markets are distinct.
Firm-speciﬁc productivity keeps changing, and as a result some exporters will not be
12Despite its counterfactual implications, the economy without ﬁxed costs has some distinct advan-
tages in terms of tractability, resulting from the fact that Qt suﬃces to determine aggregate dynamics.
The economy is isomorphic to a durable goods economy in which durable goods are produced using
labor Ht−Lt and (1−1/γ)ln(Lt) is added to ﬂow utility. The dynamics can be completely characterized
in a simple phase diagram.
27selling as much in the domestic market as other ﬁrms that never entered the foreign
markets. Furthermore, their exports may be small and not enough to recover the cost
o fs e t t i n gu pt h ee x p o r to p e r a t i o n .T h i si sw h a ti ss e e ni nt h ed a t aa n dc o u l dn o to c c u r
in Melitz [2003].13
4.4 The Managerial Productivity Interpretation
Up to now, the quality variable z h a sb e e na na t t r i b u t eo faﬁrm. Anything produced
by the ﬁrm has quality z, no matter who is hired to do the work. An alternative is to
assume the quality variable z is an attribute of the manager who runs the ﬁrm, as in
Lucas [1978]. An entrepreneur can use λE units of labor to create an entry opportunity.
When the entry opportunity arises, the entrepreneur becomes the manager of the ﬁrm.
As long as this manager runs the ﬁrm, quality evolves according to (18). A manager
cannot be supplying labor on the side, and quality drops to zero if the manager decides
to quit. The manager’s outside opportunity remains to work at the wage wt.I n t h i s
economy, λF =1and the value of being a manager is simply wt(V (s)+1 /ρ) when the
ﬁrm is in state s at time t. The manager shuts down the ﬁrm and becomes a worker
again when this value falls below wt/ρ, which is exactly when s reaches B.
An obvious diﬃculty with this very simple story is that we do observe turnover in
top management, and most larger ﬁrms do not break up when their CEO retires. But
the example serves to emphasize that V (s) need not be the market value of a ﬁrm. The
quality z could be due to a manager or team of managers who are in control of the
ﬁrm. Interesting issues arise when one asks to what extent z can be transferred from
one manager to the next.
One can take this a step further by taking z to be a composite of ﬁrm and managerial
attributes. Holmes and Schmitz [1995] take this approach in their analysis of managerial
turnover at small businesses. Gabaix and Landier [2008] and Tervio [2008] describe a
competitive assignment model, in the tradition of Rosen [1982] and Sattinger [1993], in
which there is heterogeneity in both ﬁrm and managerial attributes. The quantitative
implications of fully dynamic versions of these models remain to be investigated.
4.5 Endogenizing Incumbent Productivity Growth
In the economy described so far, aggregate growth does not depend on how incumbent
productivity grows when there is a balanced growth path with a stationary size distrib-
13Arkolakis [2006] explains the existence of small exporters by introducing a marketing cost that
exhibits increasing marginal costs in the number of consumers reached.
28ution. But the level of the balanced growth path certainly does. This is one reason to
open the black box that produces the zt,a given in (18).
In a two-country version of the above economy, Atkeson and Burstein [2009] make θI
a choice variable of the ﬁrm. Their main assumption is that the cost, in units of labor, of
choosing a particular growth rate θI is equal to zγ−1 times an increasing convex function
of θI. Because vt[z]/wt ∝ zγ−1, the assumption that costs scale with zγ−1 is critical
to ensure that Gibrat’s law holds for large z. The same proportionality arises in the
organization capital examples of Section 3, but the constant-returns-to-scale justiﬁcation
given there is no longer available to motivate the assumption of Atkeson and Burstein
[2009].
To provide a motivation for this way of accounting for Gibrat’s Law, suppose the
ﬁxed cost λF includes compensation for a manager who has one unit of eﬀo r tp e ru n i to f
time that can be allocated to overseeing current production and improving productivity.
Productivity grows at a rate θI = g(x) when the manager uses x units of eﬀort to
improve productivity. Current productivity is z×(h(y))1/(γ−1) instead of z if the manager
uses y units of eﬀort to manage current production. So managerial attention has a
multiplicative eﬀect on current quality. Because of the unique position the manager is
in, neither task can be delegated or outsourced, and so x and y have to add up to the
one unit of eﬀo r ta v a i l a b l et ot h em a n a g e r . B o t hg and h are increasing and smooth,
and h is positive. The Bellman equation for the value of the ﬁrm is then












and V (B)=0at an exit boundary B.C o n j e c t u r et h a tx is approximately independent of
s for large s. Recall that the present value of es received in perpetuity is es/(ρ−[μ+σ2/2])
if the drift of s is a constant μ.F o r l a r g e s,t h eﬁxed cost has a minor eﬀect on the
value of the ﬁrm, and thus one expects V (s) to behave like es when s is large. In turn,
the optimal allocation of managerial eﬀort satisﬁes esDh(1 − x)=( γ − 1)Dg(x)DV (s)
if it is interior, and this then conﬁrms the conjecture. In words, an approximate version
of Gibrat’s law arises here because the tasks of overseeing production and improving
productivity must be assigned to the same manager.
4.6 Endogenizing Entry Productivity Growth
The entry quality process Zt has up to now been viewed as an independent source of ideas
that drives aggregate growth when it increases fast enough relative to what incumbent
producers can come up with. Perhaps some fraction of the population is motivated
29simply by the bragging rights of having raised Zt to Zt(1 + θEdt), for the public good.
Perhaps the economy has a sector that replicates and improves blueprints along the lines
of Section 3.5, and entrepreneurs need these blueprints to start new ﬁrms.
An alternative is to assume that ideas are generated by incumbent ﬁrms and that
Zt is the result of imitation by entrants. This type of spillover goes back to Arrow
[1962] and has played a dominant role in modeling endogenous growth over the past
two decades. Take θI again to be exogenous and interpret the quality process (18) as
the outcome of learning by doing or experimentation by incumbent ﬁrms. Firms choose
to stop this process and exit when their quality reaches a level Xt <Z t that solves
st[Xt]=B. Entrants imitate and improve the quality of exiting ﬁrms. The entry cost
λE allows entrants to start with a quality e(γ−1)∆Xt for some ∆ > 0.F r o m ( 2 0 ) , t h i s
implies S −B = ∆. Along a balanced growth path with positive entry, the cost of entry
must match the value V (S) of newly created ﬁrms. Hence
λE = λFV (B + ∆). (23)
Since B and V (·) depend only on ρ, μ =( γ − 1)(θE − θI) and σ =( γ − 1)σI,t h i s
equilibrium condition determines θE.
The simple equilibrium condition (23) leads to straightforward comparative statics.
An increase in the equilibrium value of θE lowers the function V (·), as incumbents fall
behind more quickly. It follows that θE is increasing in ∆, as the higher value of entry
implied by an increase in ∆ is oﬀ-set in equilibrium by a higher growth rate θE. Greater
improvements by entrants raise the growth rate of the economy. More rapid increases
in incumbent quality also raise the growth rate of the economy: an increase in the
incumbent growth rate θI leads to a one-for-one increase in θE,s ot h a tμ and therefore
V (·) remain unchanged. In sharp contrast to what happens when entry productivity is
an independent source of ideas, the equilibrium growth rate of the economy now responds
one for one to changes in incumbent growth.
4.6.1 Ensuring Stationarity
Ad i ﬃculty is, again, that there may not be a balanced growth path with a stationary size
distribution. The equilibrium value of μimplied by (23) does not guarantee η > μ+σ2/2,
and if this condition is violated then the aggregate demand for labor by ﬁr m si si n ﬁnite.
This turns out to be an artifact of the assumption, maintained so far in Section 4,
that entrepreneurial eﬀort and labor are perfect substitutes. This makes the equilibrium
condition (23) depend only on growth rates, and not on the number of ﬁrms. If instead
30the supplies of labor and entrepreneurial eﬀort are not perfectly elastic, as in Section 3,
then the equilibrium conditions become
%
E(V (B + ∆))
















where E(·) and L(·) are the supplies of entrepreneurial eﬀort and labor introduced in
Section 3.1. The ﬁrst condition ensures that there is enough entry to make the number
of ﬁr m sg r o wa tt h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t e . T h es e c o n di st h el a b o rm a r k e tc l e a r i n g
condition. The value function V , the exit barrier B and the stationary density f are all
functions of θE,v i aμ. These two conditions therefore jointly determine θE and N/H,
and the labor market clearing condition forces the mean of es to be ﬁnite (Luttmer
[2009].)
4.7 Alternative Entry and Fixed Cost Assumptions
The assumption that some type of labor is essential for starting and continuing ﬁrms is
a key ingredient in generating a stationary employment size distribution. The following
two examples illustrate what can happen when one deviates from this assumption.14
4.7.1 Romer [1990]
Famously, Romer [1990] has an important scale eﬀect that arises from the assumption
that the cost of introducing new goods, measured in units of labor, declines with the
existing number of goods. Consider, therefore, what happens when there is no population
growth. The entry cost in Romer [1990] is λE/Nt units of labor, reﬂecting a positive
externality from having many producers. Balanced growth can arise only if the ﬁxed cost
is taken to be λF/Nt. The growth rate of consumption and wages is κ = θE +ω/(γ −1)
instead of (19), where ω is the equilibrium growth rate of the number of commodities.
Along a balanced growth path Ct and wt grow at the same rate, and so est[z],a sd e ﬁned
in (20) with λE replaced by λE/Nt, continues to be proportional to (z/Qt)γ−1.S i n c e
both entry and ﬁxed costs are proportional to 1/Nt, the equilibrium condition with
positive entry is λE = λFV (S), and this determines S as before. The Kolmogorov
forward equation for the size distribution is now ωf(s)=−μDf(s)+1
2σ2D2f(s),a n d
this implies a size distribution (22), but with ζ and ζ∗ now a function of ω instead of η.
The remaining condition for a balanced growth path is now the labor market clearing



















which no longer depends on N because entry and ﬁxed costs are (λF,λE)/Nt.T h i s
equilibrium condition determines the growth rate ω,a n dt h es c a l ee ﬀect is apparent
from the fact that this equilibrium condition depends on H. By construction, (25) will
force ω to be such that the mean of es is ﬁnite. As in (24), the fact that the growth rate
of the economy is jointly determined with the labor market clearing condition ensures
that the stationary size distribution will have a ﬁnite mean. But it is important to note
here what is actually stationary: the state variable st[zt−a,a]. The deﬁnition (20) with λF
replaced by λF/Nt t e l l su st h a tzt−a,a/Qt will be stationary, and then (16) implies that
Ntlt[zt−a,a] is stationary. Since Nt g r o w sa tt h er a t eω, the employment size distribution
cannot be stationary. As the number of ﬁr m sa n dg o o d si nt h ee c o n o m yg r o w so v e r
time, while the population is constant, the average ﬁrm must shrink at an exponential
rate as the economy moves along its balanced growth path. This does not ﬁt the data.
4.7.2 Atkeson and Burstein [2009]
Atkeson and Burstein [2009] take entry and ﬁxed costs to be proportional to a Cobb-
Douglas composite of labor and ﬁnal output. To describe what this does, consider the
extreme case in which entry and ﬁxed costs are constant in units of ﬁnal output. This is
the lab-equipment speciﬁcation of Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991]. Interpret λE and λF
to be the cost parameters in units of ﬁnal output and deﬁne est[z] = vt[z]/λE instead of
est[z] = vt[z]/(λFwt). Conjecture that there is a balanced growth path with the number
of ﬁrms growing at some rate ω.W i t h ﬁrms exiting at a constant exit barrier B,t h i s
implies an entry rate ε = ω + 1
2σ2Df(B). The aggregate resource constraint is then




instead of (17). Balanced growth requires that Ct and Nt grow at the common rate ω,
and then the right-hand side of this resource constraint implies ω = θE +η +ω/(γ −1).







It is easy to see that the calculations in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 continue to apply, with η
replaced by ω. In particular, the modiﬁed deﬁnition of st[z] implies that the distribution
32of zt−a,a/Qt is stationary, and the mean of est[zt−a,a] will be ﬁnite if μ + 1
2σ2 < ω.P e r -
capita consumption and wages grow at the rate κ = ω − η. That is, growth manifests
itself entirely in the diﬀerence between the growth rate of the number of ﬁrms and the
population growth rate. If γ > 2,t h i si sp o s i t i v ei fθE + η is positive, and thus average
ﬁrm employment must decrease exponentially over time. The ﬁrm employment size
distribution cannot be stationary. In Atkeson and Burstein [2009], these complications
d on o tc o m et ot h ef o r eb e c a u s eθE and η are both assumed to be zero, and hence ω =0
if γ > 2. In the knife-edge case of γ =2 , aggregate output simpliﬁes to NtQtHt and
there is a balanced growth path if θE = η =0 . The resulting economy is an AK economy
and if entry costs are not too high, the number of ﬁrms will grow at some positive rate
ω. The employment size distribution must again be non-stationary.
5. Crqfoxglqj Rhpdunv
Firms can be large for many reasons. They can be highly productive and face only
weak decreasing returns to scale, or produce a variety that is a close substitute for what
others can produce. They can be marginally more productive than other ﬁrms and have
had enough time to grow and exploit this advantage. Their managers may be highly
skilled and therefore control larger teams of employees or larger hierarchies. A better
account of the quantitative importance of each of these interpretations is needed. Such
an account can tell us more about what drives aggregate productivity growth. More
generally, it can serve as a backbone for attempts to improve our understanding of the
aggregate economy. Why does unemployment take such a long time to come down
following a recession? Perhaps some of the work discussed here can provide a basis for
better models of how new and existing ﬁrms create jobs.
A common thread in the models surveyed in this paper is the importance of selection
and reallocation as a mechanism for getting the economy to grow. Blueprints that
can no longer be improved fall behind and are discarded, while frontier blueprints are
improved and replicated rapidly. Firms that achieve few productivity improvements are
forced to exit and are replaced by entrants that can do better. Selection can operate at
many levels, ranging from the level of individual employees to that of ﬁr m sa saw h o l e .
Trial and error combined with selection is a mechanism that can be helped by foresight
b u td o e sn o tr e q u i r ei t ,a n dt h el a r g eg r o s sﬂows we see at all levels indicates that
getting productivity improvements right is diﬃcult. The empirical work of Restuccia
and Rogerson [2008] and Hsieh and Klenow [2009] suggests that impediments to this
reallocation process can have large eﬀects on aggregate output.
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